

Metropolis Conference 2018  
Sydney, ICC, October/November, 2018


## Some Key Conclusions Drawn from the European Refugee Crisis

*Franck Duvell, German Centre for Integration and Migration Research (DeZIM,  
Berlin) and Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, Oxford (COMPAS)*

# Context

- Displaced persons: 65.3 mio. (2015).
- Displaced persons in EU neighbourhood: 22 mio.
  - Displacement in the wider neighbourhood of the EU represents around 1/3 of the global total.
- 2/3 displaced within countries, 1/3 fled to other countries (e.g. Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Russia), only <3% to EU.
- 2015/16: 1.4 mio. arrivals in EU by sea, another 350.000 arrived overland, mostly from the Balkan, 8,770 died.
- Asylum applications EU: 2.3 mio. (2015/16).
- Arrivals of 2015/16 added 0.3% to total population of EU.

# Lesson 1: Geographies more complex than public simplifications suggest



## ***ROUTES***



*Third route* linked Eastern and Western Med rote

Routes are constantly shifting, now Western Med is the main route.

Total of 8 sub-routes.


Total of 94 individual routes through 57 countries involving over 3,000 towns and cities.

# Reality (N=122)



## Duration

- The first group **travelled fast, 0-3 months**, from their country of origin to the EU, **39%**
- The second group **stayed in other countries, 4-18 months**, **32.4%** (Lebanon, Gulf countries, Libya or Turkey)
- A third group **first resided in other countries >18 months, ø 3½ years**, **28.6%**



## Lesson 2: Secondary root causes are as important to address as primary root causes

There were two types of root causes:

- Primary causes in country of origin (77% political reasons, 23% economic reasons).
- Secondary causes in first, second etc country of residence (lack of status, lack of income, discrimination/racism, diminishing hope to return, outbreaks of violence)

- In total, more than half of our respondents had no clear intention of moving to Europe, no few had no intentions at all but basically drifted with the flow or responded ad hoc to opportunities arising.



# Lesson 3: Smugglers are not all the same. There are genuine and rogue actors

## Hubs



Izmir (*Equipment*)



Tripolis  
(*Employment*)



Istanbul  
(*Communication*)

- **Most migration infrastructures are regular**, usually only the last part, entering the EU, is irregular.
- **Smugglers developed two different business models each** generating different risks and result in different death rates.
- Two types of smugglers offer two types of services, **genuine respectively rogue services**.
- In the eyes of many refugees smugglers are ‘human rights heroes’ (quote)

## Lesson 4: Policy complacency is to be avoided and displacement better managed

### Key short-comings

- Large-scale displacement began 2011 but *EU and international community were complacent.*
- *Issue was left to region* (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey).
- Calls for Syrian refugee conference were ignored.
- 2016 *UN refugee conference came too late.*
- *Neglecting side-effects of restriction* (death rate in the Med has soared from 0.75 % in 2015 to 12 % in 2018).

## Lesson 5: Don't blame migrants/refugees for much more fundamental social ills

- The *EU is an instable system* (chaos theory) characterised by deepening and widening inequality and increasing frustration of its people.
- The arrival of refugees - adding only 0.3 % to the EU population – only *triggered but did not cause the crisis* of the EU.
- The causes of the crisis are complex and cannot be attributed to a single cause (social *complexity theory*).